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Foreign military sales (FMS) have grown significantly in
dollar volume. The General Accounting Office has accused the
Department of Defense (DOD) of a longstanding inability to
manage the FMS program, and recently recommended centraliza-
tion of accounting and disbursing functions as the best
long-range solution to the program's problems. Defense
subsequently initiated a limited test of centralization at
the Security Assistance Accounting Center. The test involves
several major direct-cite procurement contracts, and was
designed to form the basis of DOD's response to the Congress
regarding the centralized concept. This thesis describes and
evaluates this ongoing test, in particular, its relevancy
towards the decision of whether or not to expand and
implement centralization of the FMS program. The study
concludes that, although centralization is not a panacea for
all the problems of the U.S. foreign military sales program,
and cannot be expected to produce instant solutions, it is an
advancement. Until a better alternative is developed,
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United States foreign policy since World War II has been
to provide military assistance to friendly foreign countries.
The growth in foreign military sales (FMS) in the past
several years has been astonishing. Although the program has
been in existence for almost thirty years, annual FMS orders
did not exceed the billion dollar level until the late
1 9 6 ' s . Since 1974, annual sales have consistently surpassed
$10 billion. The last two years have seen sales in the $15
billion area . [Ref . 1]
FMS has become "big business". Along with a rapid growth
in sales there has been a nightmarish list of problems in
accounting and control. So much so that in 1976, the
Security Assistance Accounting Center (SAAC) was established
for the purpose of being the executive for the Department of
Defense (DOD), singularly responsible for billing and
collecting all monies due under the FMS program. Despite
improvements in many areas since the inception of SAAC,
accounting for FMS continues to be plagued by problems. The
General Accounting Office (GAO) and defense audit agencies
have issued numerous reports on the quality and management of
the FMS program. Generally speaking, the reports have been
critical, with the major area of criticism being DOD's

inadequate financial accounting system. In a Business Week
article it was alleged that the Department of Defense had
"lost track of up to $30 billion (in FMS)" [Ref. 2]. It
stated that the DOD accounting system was so unkempt,
disorganized, and inadequate, that it was not able to
determine whether those unaccounted-for FMS monies were the
result of accounting errors, using the funds for something
other than FMS, or the undercharging of foreign customers--or
a combination of all three. A high-ranking defense official
speculated that it would be at least five years before the
accounting problems would be straightened out. [Ref. 3]
B. ISSUES
In May 1979, GAO issued an overview of the problems
identified in accounting, billing, and collecting for the FMS
program [Ref. 4]. SAAC, created as DOD ' s single point of
contact for foreign countries' FMS financial inquiries, is
largely dependent upon the military departments. Each
Service is responsible for detailed obligation, expenditure,
and cost accounting; for paying contractors; and for
reporting disbursements as well as other financial
information to SAAC. Each department has developed its own
system of accounting. SAAC is dependent upon their inputs,
which are nonstandard, to prepare billings, reimburse the




After highlighting problem areas, GAO went on to state
that although improvements had been made and further
improvements might result, DOD had been unable to correct its
longstanding FMS financial management and accounting
problems. "The Department lacks an adequate program-wide
plan to solve the problems. Efforts to correct them have
been piecemeal; policy has been established by the ASD
(Comptroller) and implemented by the military departments as
they saw fit" [Ref. 5]. Long-range planning was lacking.
GAO'S solution to the FMS accounting and financial
management problems was centralization. The ASD (Comptroller),
because of pressure from the House Appropriations Committee,
took heed and, in November 1979, outlined DOD's plan for
centralized FMS accounting. Congress had required that the
plan include accounting for obligations, expenditures, and
disbursements of funds, and that it should ensure that all
costs properly chargeable to the program were fully
recovered. Only transactions involving direct-cite
procurements were to be considered. A six- to twelve-month
test wherein the obligation accounting and disbursing for
several large FMS contracts from each military department was
to take place at SAAC. This test was to provide a basis for
evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of
centralization and the degree of centralization yielding the
greatest benefit for the investment of resources. [Ref. 6]
11

C. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF STUDY
The principal objective of the research was to analyze
and evaluate the centralized test performed at the Security
Assistance Accounting Center. This included a critical look
at the validity of the centralized accounting concept itself.
The relevance of SAAC ' s findings in both the support of
centralization and the fulfillment of full-cost recovery
requirements were tantamount.
This thesis does not address the political question of
whether the United States should or should not be an exporter
of military equipments and services. Neither are the costs
and benefits of FMS and their effect upon the military
sevices and the U.S. economy discussed. It is assumed that
FMS will continue to be a major element of United States
foreign policy, and the management, financial control, and
accounting for FMS by DOD will take on increased importance
in the future.
Primarily, the research for this thesis was directed
towards reviewing the centralized FMS accounting concept and
the conduct of test and evaluation procedures, and results,
at the Security Assistance Accounting Center. The
establishment of the U.S. foreign military sales at-cost
requirement and a review of the existing FMS financial and
accounting problems recently experienced by DOD were




Data for the thesis was gained from personal interviews
with personnel from the Security Assistance Accounting Center
(SAAC); review of internal memoranda, point papers, and
applicable instructions; review of audit reports; research
reports and theses written on FMS, especially in the areas of
financial management and accounting; and instructional
information gleaned from Professor W. H. Cullin's course,
"Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Management."
E. ORGANIZATION
The reader should have a basic knowledge of the develop-
ment of FMS in order to understand the complexities and
problems of the program and how they came about. Accordingly,
a brief history is outlined and discussed in Chapter II.
Chapter III continues the overview with a synopsis of
applicable restrictions and requirements legislated by public
law. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) is of particular
importance in this area in that it established the basis for
the U.S. foreign military sales at-cost accounting policy.
Specific requirements for billing foreign customers, transfer
of obligation and expenditure authority, and methods of
financing FMS cases are discussed. Chapter IV elicits
several major financial management and accounting problems
experienced recently by DOD. It was the long history of
these inadequacies that led GAO to pronounce centralized
accounting as the long-range solution.
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Chapter V examines the centralization concept itself, as
proposed by the General Accounting Office. The advantages
and disadvantages of central accounting and control, versus a
program of separate systems by each military service, are
addressed.
Chapters VI and VII review the development and status of
DOD's centralization test taking place at SAAC. The test
results are examined for relevancy towards the decision of
whether or not to expand and implement centralization.
Chapter VIII looks at the current status of the on-going
test and the likelihood of implementation. The complete
resolution of all significant problems presently confronting
the FMS accounting system, by expanding centralization, at
least in the short term, is questioned. It is speculated
that centralization is, however, the long-range hope for
financial control of the program.
In summary, the research basically examines DOD's
problems and responsibilities in managing the FMS accounting
system. Centralization, as the solution, and its test being
conducted at SAAC, are critically reviewed.
14

II. BACKGROUND OF FMS
Foreign policy must start with security. A nation's
survival is at its first and ultimate responsibility; it
cannot be compromised or put to risk. There can be no
security for us or for others unless the strength of the
free countries is in balance with that of potential
adversaries and no stability in power relationships is
conceivable without America's active participation in
world affairs. [Ref. 7]
A. HISTORY
A primary means used to implement foreign and national
security policy has been and remains through the transfer of
defense articles, services, training, and economic assistance;
or, stated another way, by providing security assistance.
America's policy since World War II has been to provide this
military assistance to friendly foreign nations. Security
assistance can exist in two different forms--grant aid and
military export sales. There are two types of grant aid:
the military Assistance Program (MAP) and International
Military Education and Training (IMET). The MAP, which began
under the Military Defense Assistance Act of 1949, was
designed to provide for the security of the U.S. by
furnishing equipment and services to allied and friendly
nations. These were furnished at no cost--a "free" or "give
away" program. IMET was established to assist in developing
needed expertise and fostering an indigenous training
capacity within each of the foreign countries involved.
15

Military export sales are either commercial, direct
procurements by a foreign country from U.S. private sources,
or FMS, sales by the U.S. Government to a foreign government.
The legislative basis for FMS is the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (PL 87-195), as amended. In 1976, the name of
the Act was changed to the International Security Assistance
and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (PL 94-329). It
authorizes the President to procure and sell defense services
to eligible foreign countries or international organizations.
It also authorizes the sales of defense articles from 00D
stocks. The Act charges the Secretary of State with the
overall responsibility for supervision and direction of
sales, including whether or not there will be a sale to a
country and the sale's amount. Procurement authority is
delegated to the Secretary of Defense. Within DOD, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security
Affairs (ASD (ISA)), formulates policy and guidance on
matters pertaining to security assistance. The Defense
Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) directs and supervises the
administration and implementation of that policy and
guidance. [Ref. 3]
B. GROWTH OF FMS
At the inception of the Security Assistance Program (SAP)
in 1949, and for considerable time thereafter, most military
assistance provided by the U.S. was grant aid. The Mutual
Security Act of 1951 formalized the foreign aid procedures
16

under which grant aid was made. The U.S. had provided $29.9
billion through MAP until 1961, while only 2.5 billion in
materiel and services had been sold during the same time
frame. [Ref. 9]
Several factors led to the reversal of roles played by
grant aid and military export sales. Toward the end of the
1950' s, the United States' military surpluses of World War II
were depleted. An unfavorable balance of payments trend was
also being established. These, in addition to the economic
progress made by our allies, allowing them to purchase weapon
systems directly, or through credits, were causal of the role
reversal. Each year since 1974, FMS have exceeded grant aid,
and today FMS comprises approximately 90 percent of the U.S.
security assistance program. [Ref. 10]
C. CREATION OF THE SAAC
Prior to October 1976, each of the military departments
acted independently in the conduct of its FMS program. Each
Service was responsible for procuring, accounting, disburs-
ing, billing, and collecting funds for FMS cases from foreign
customers. With the sharp increase in the FMS program since
1974, DOD's financial management system was not capable nor
designed to handle the tremendous growth. Because of the
time pressures and rapid expansion of the program, DOD had to
add foreign military sales accounting requirements to the
existing financial management systems, instead of designing
and implementing separate financial systems for FMS.
1 7

Several GAO reports criticized DOD for subsidizing the
F M S program with U.S. funds since the cost of the program
could not be readily identified. This was a result of the
inability of the DOD financial systems to collect pertinent
costs such as administrative, transportation, packaging and
handling, military and civilian salaries plus fringe
benefits, and R&D costs, applicable to a unique FMS case.
Additionally, foreign countries began to complain about the
numerous billings received from each of the military services
and questioned why they could not receive single billings.
In an attempt to resolve some of these criticisms, DOD
began to centralize the FMS management. One of the significant
steps taken was the creation of a central billing and collec-
tion agency in the Security Assistance Accounting Center (SAAC)
The SAAC was established in 1976 by the Secretary of
Defense as the central DOD activity for carrying out certain
responsibilities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and
the Arms Export Control Act. As the executive for DOD under
the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), it was singu-
larly responsible for the billing, collecting, and trust fund
accounting system for security assistance. SAAC simulta-
neously served as the central point of contact within DOD for
all FMS-related financial inquiries, and as a focal point for
DOD-wide procedural and operational financial systems.
Within these responsibilities, SAAC also was responsible
as the primary data base for reporting FMS program status to
18

Congress, the National Security Council, Office of Management
and Budget (0MB), and other executive agencies. The SAAC was
collocated with the Air Force Accounting and Finance Center
(AFAFC) in Denver, Colorado and placed under the direction of
the director of AFAFC, who was also appointed as the
Assistant Director, DSAA. The first centralized billing was
achieved in May 1977, when the SAAC released a billing
statement to all FMS customers. It was 66,400 pages long and
requested customer payments of $2.1 billion. [Ref. 11]
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III. ACCOUNTING FOR FMS
You may recall that GAO has beat us severely about the
head and shoulders for not recovering all the quality
assurance costs in the manner prescribed in DOD
Instruction 2140.1. Notwithstanding our serious
objections to the shortcomings and overstatements in the
GAO findings, the House Appropriations Committee went
ahead and reduced the Services' FY 1980 O&M budgets by
the amounts that GAO alleged were lost. [Ref. 12]
A. REQUIREMENTS
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) provides the legal
basis for FMS accounting policies and procedures. DOD
Instruction 2140.3 and the Military Assistance and Sales
Manual (MASM) supply amplifying information. The following
requirements warrant special emphasis.
1. " No profit/no loss" to the U.S. Government
The U.S. Government, in procuring the furnishing the
materiel and services requested by a foreign government, does
so on a nonprofit basis for the benefit of the foreign
purchaser. The foreign customer agrees to pay the U.S.
Government the total costs incurred regardless of the sales
terms negotiated at the time of the acceptance of the offer.
The U.S. Government is only obligated to notify the foreign
government if the expected cost of the sale is to increase
above ten percent of the original estimate.
Each FMS "case," or contractual sales agreement
between the United States and an eligible foreign country or
20

international organization, is documented by a Letter of
Offer and Acceptance (LOA), also known as DD Form 1513. The
LOA is the formal document by which the U.S. Government
offers, and the foreign government accepts, the sale of spe-
cific defense articles and services. It stipulates the items
and/or services, estimated costs, and the terms and
conditions of sale. The LOA also specifies an expiration
date, which is developed through the consideration of several
factors such as: the contractor price quote expiration date,
normal processing time, and sensitivity of any information in
the LOA.
2 . Advance Collection of FMS Costs
The purchaser, unless the DO Form 1513 specifies
otherwise, must agree to the U.S. Government policy of
collecting the foreign country's funds in advance of
deliveries or progress payments to contractors. These
advance collections are subsequently available for progress
payments, contractor holdbacks, potential termination
charges, and deliveries from DOD inventories. The LOA
Financial Annex (Payment Schedule) specifies the down payment
and schedule of payments to be followed. The AECA also states
that the total funds on deposit should be sufficient to meet
the payments required by the contract and any damages and
cost that may occur from the cancellation of such contract in
advance of the time such payments, damages, or costs are due.
The funds are kept on deposit with the U.S. Treasury.
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3. Collection of Interest on Delinquent Accounts
The foreign country must agree to pay interest on any
net amount which it is in arrears on payments, as determined
by considering collectively all of the country's open LOA's
within 00D.
4. Standardized Billing Procedures
It is DOD policy that the form, content, cycle,
basis, and adjustment of FMS billing to foreign countries and
international organizations be standardized. This is a
responsibility of the SAAC.
B. PRICING
The systems of controls, pricing quidelines, and
reporting systems of FMS evolved from MAP. During the 1960's
and early 1970's there was little emphasis placed on what now
is called "full cost recovery", since management emphasis
tended to be placed on the security assistance aspect of the
program, rather than on the sales act per se. [Ref. 13]
Today, with the passage of the AECA in 1976, there is a
greater emphasis on the recovery of all costs in DOD pricing.
The Department of Defense follows a policy of uniform
application of pricing and cost criteria in FMS management.
This means that DOD pricing and procedures provide for the
charging of all DOD direct and indirect costs, including
those referred to as an "administrative charge" for the use
of DOD's logistics system. In order to assure that all costs
are covered, quotations on defense articles and services dre
22

estimated and final adjustments are made after delivery of
the items or rendering of the services. The DD Form 1513
provides for these estimated prices.
Pricing defense articles and services can be divided into
two areas— those from DOD stocks and those which are newly
procured. Items from stock inventories are handled in
accordance with DOD Instruction 2140.1. Standard prices
govern when nonexcess materiel is to be sold. This includes
all items in the U.S. military supply system, except major
items, like complete ships. Standard prices include current
market or procurement costs, and they are generally revised
annually. If materiel is in long supply, or if the inventory
manager determines there is a difference in utility, standard
prices may be reduced. Excess materiel is sold in an "as is"
condition. The selling price is the higher of (a) its market
value as military hardware, or (b) fair value computed by
applying a fair value rate to inventory price. Prices of
defense articles and services procured for foreign governments
must include recovery of the full DOD contract costs (including
the cost of government materiel). In addition, the purchaser
must pay any damages or costs that accrue from the purchaser's
cancellation of the contract. Authorized surcharges are added
to the contract cost and included in the billing.
Prices of defense articles and services sold to eligible




1. Accessorial costs--for expenses of issuing and trans-
ferring materiel (if applicable). This is similar to a
materiel handling charge and is generally added as a
percentage factor.
2. Administrative Charge--for expenses of sales
negotiation, procurement, accounting, budgeting, etc. In
accordance with DOD Instruction 2140.1, a charge of five
percent is normally added to the basic sales price of FMS
orders. DSAA is authorized to reduce this charge to three
percent on sales of nonstandard articles (those not actively
managed because associated end items have been retired or
ne^er purchased for DOD components). The administrative
charge is applicable to all transactions.
3. Nonrecurring Cost Recovery--for DOD investment in
RDT&E and production costs (if applicable). These are
assessed on a pro rata basis. In other words, the FMS
customer is charged a per unit amount determined by dividing
total nonrecurring costs by the total production quantity
(past production plus estimated future production).
4. Asset Use--for use if DOD facilities and equipment
(if applicable); these are added as a percentage factor.
5. Recurring Support Costs--costs that are directly
related to FMS delivery from a production contract.
C. FMS TRUST FUND
The FMS trust fund is a fund managed by the Treasury in
which FMS monies from foreign governments are held in trust,
24

or in a fiduciary capacity, by the U.S. Government for use
in making purchases specified in an LOA. The SAAC has
accounting responsibility for the trust fund even though the
funds are on deposit with the Treasury. The FMS trust fund
represents the sum total of all cash received from all
foreign countries and held by the Treasury for FMS purchases.
Receipts and disbursements are accounted for at the country
level regardless of what case they are made for. Individual
case accounting records are maintained by SAAC.
The following principles apply to trust fund management:
1. One foreign country's balance cannot be used to
finance another foreign country's programs.
2. Cash disbursements are controlled on a country basis,
although accounting for FMS transactions is on an FMS case
level basis.
3. With the purchaser's permission, cash receipts in the
trust fund can be shifted within a country's program (between
cases). The accounting status of each individual case is
still maintained by SAAC, however.
4. Dollars received into the FMS trust fund increase the
overall volume of funds within the United States Treasury.
The dollars become part of the overall U.S. Treasury
accounting system, and are therefore under U.S. Government
control from date of receipt. SAAC, as the accountable
agency, renders periodic reports to the Treasury. [Ref. 14]
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D. FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL
Two forms are prescribed for use by the military services
in accounting for FMS funds: DD Form 2060 (FMS Obligational
Authority) and DD Form 2061 (FMS Planning Directive).
1. DD Form 2060
This form is prepared by the cognizant Service or
implementing agency. It is used to request obligational
authority from SAAC.
2. DD Form 2061
This form is the "detailed back-up" document for the
DD Form 2060. It shows detailed pricing elements, planned
financing appropriations (or direct citation), obligational
authority received and required at a date specified,
obligational authority required for the current year, and an
estimate of obligational authority required for the budget
year.
DD Forms 2060 and 2061 are required to be prepared
for each new FMS case at the time the LOA is prepared and
prior to its acceptance by the foreign government. In
addition, a copy of each DD Form 2060 must be submitted to
SAAC prior to the issuance of obligational authority.
[Ref .15]
Further, DD Forms 2060 are required to be submitted
before the beginning of each fiscal year reflecting the
funding status through 30 September of all active FMS cases
and identifying the amount required for obligation for the
26

current year. With this information, SAAC is able to
forecast expenditures reliably, assuming expenditures will
approximate the obligational authority approved for the year.
SAAC can also ensure that country balances in the trust fund
are sufficient to cover all costs to be incurred in the near
term as required by the AECA.
The SAAC can control FMS funds through two processes--the
issuance of obligational authority and the issuance of
expenditure authority. These two processes are exclusive of
each other.
1. Obligational authority (OA) is an authority requested
by a military service or 00D agency from SAAC (00 Form 2060)
which allows obligations (legal reservations of funds) to be
incurred within a given FMS case in an amount not to exceed
the value of the OA granted.
2. Expenditure Authority (EA) is granted by SAAC to a
military service or DOD agency to allow expenditures (actual
payments) to be incurred against obligations previously
recorded against a country's trust fund account.
E. FINANCING AND FLOW OF FUNDS
There are primary methods of financing FMS transactions.
[Ref. 16]
1. Direct Citation Method
This method involves entering and perpetuating the
FMS trust fund accounting citation on all documents. With
direct citation, expenditures are made directly from the
27

trust fund account by military disbursing offices. In
accordance with DOD Instruction 2140.1, new procurement
actions should be accomplished by this method if possible.
This is to prevent, as much as possible, subsidy of FMS
procurements with U.S. appropriations. SAAC issues monthly
country-level expenditure authorizations (EA) to Services
utilizing the direct citation method. This EA is applicable
to new procurement expenditures (e.g., progress payments),
and inventory issues from DOD stock (when an interfund
billing is made) .
2. Reimbursable Method
Under this method, expenditures are made against U.S.
appropriations, which are either supported by a cash advance
from the FMS trust fund or subsequently reimbursed. The SAAC
handles the accounting for funds transfers regarding all
reimbursables. Self-reimbursement expenditure authorization
(EA) may be issued by the SAAC--"Status of Sel f -Rei mbursement
Expenditure Authority" (DD-COMP(M) 1518). These summary
reports are supported by further details required by the SAAC
within ten days after the end of each month--"FMS Detail
Delivery Report" (DD-COMP(M) 1517). The DD-COMP (M ) 1 5 1
7
detail cards are also used by implementing DOD components in
support of requests for cash advances to appropriation
accounts. When the reimbursable method is used, there is
always the possibility that U.S. appropriations will not be
reimbursed for the full cost of the FMS case procured under it
28

In fact, the GAO has issued numerous reports revealing where
the DOD has subsidized FMS through U.S. appropriations.
Figure 1 represents the flow of funds for FMS. The process
begins with U.S. Government demands placed on the foreign
purchaser for funds. These are generally in one of two forms:
(a) the initial deposit (if applicable), reflected in the LOA
and, (b) the recurring payment requirements which are contained
in the DD Form 645 (Quarterly FMS Billing Statement). Cash
received from foreign countries, always in U.S. dollars, is
deposited into the trust fund account by the SAAC. The SAAC
controls the administration of the funds through the issuance
of obligational authority and expenditure authority.
F. BILLINGS TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
The FMS Billing Statement (DD Form 645) is used in billing
foreign governments. The statements are prepared and forwarded
by SAAC to the FMS purchaser on a quarterly basis (i.e., for
quarters ending March, June, September, and December). The DD
Form 645 represents the official claim for payment by the U.S.
Government and furnishes an accounting to the FMS purchaser of
all costs incurred on its behalf for each FMS case. The terms
of sale of each case dictate the timing, amounts, and due date
for payments against these billings, on time and in full, by
the terms of sale. Interest, at a rate determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury, is chargeable on any net amount due
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This period may be extended by the President to one hundred and
twenty days (only upon his submission of this determination to
Congress )
.
The correctness of a FMS billing is largely dependent upon
the military services. The timeliness and accuracy of their
input to the SAAC is tantamount. The implementing DOD
components report performance and execution to the SAAC by use
of the DD-COMP(M) 1517 (FMS Detail Delivery Report). The
report is made on magnetic tape or punched card and is
submitted on a monthly basis. Expenditures, progress payments,
and delivery information is reported in this manner.
Inaccurate data or delays in submission can result, among other
problems, in under-or-over-payments by purchasers and
under-or-overrei mbursement of the performing accounts of the
military departments. [Ref. 17]
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IV. FMS PROBLEMS DISCLOSED
Defense could not fully explain differences of $1.5
billion between its official trust fund accounting
records showing cash on hand and the detailed records
used to provide foreign governments an accounting of how
their funds were spent. Defense problems in accounting
and reportng foreign military sales disbursements and
collections were disclosed in 1976 when the Services
transferred responsibility for maintaining detailed sales
case accounting records to the Security Assistance
Accounting Center. Since then, the differences have
increased. [Ref. 13]
A. FMS POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
On June 17, 1977, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) directed that a new FMS financial reporting
system be adopted. When fully implemented, it was to:
(1) provide an integrated accounting and financial control
system, (2) provide accounting support for the budget,
(3) facilitate budgeting, financial planning and cost
estimating, and (4) ensure compliance with all requirements
for the administrative control of funds and provide a trust
fund accounting system that would meet GAO standards. The
system was not intended to provide for detailed obligation,
expenditure, and cost accounting or for disbursing foreign
customer funds or for billing and collecting. These
functions would continue to be carried out by the military
departments and the SAAC. [Ref. 19]
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In response to the Assistant Secretary's memorandum, and
because SAAC's billing, collecting, and trust fund system did
not provide the necessary financial accounting and control,
the Center began developing the Defense Integrated Financial
System (DIFS) in November 1977. This system, designed to
cover various facets of FMS financial management— part icul arl y
billing, collecting, and trust fund accounting- -remains
dependent upon input from the military departments.
It has now been almost three years since system implemen-
tation was mandated, and full implementation has not occurred.
Actions by the Services to comply have varied. In addition
to SAAC's DIFS, the Army developed a new obligational control
system. It has had a history of errors, frequently
documented by the Army Audit Agency. The Air Force attempted
without success, to adapt its existing system in order to
implement the memorandum. The Navy modified its existing
system. Uniform accounting and financial reporting has not
been attained. Nonstandard accounting data is currently
received by the SAAC, necessitating numerous modifications,
and frequently contributing to accounting errors.
B. COST RECOVERY IN FMS
With the enactment of the AECA, Congress attempted to
strengthen and clarify FMS cost recovery requirements as a
matter of law. Its legislative history indicates that
Congress intended that indirect as well as direct costs of
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goods and services sold to foreign governments be recovered
so that the FMS program would not be subsidized by DOD
appropriations [Ref. 20]. There has been some disagreement,
however, as to which elements of cost, particularly indirect
costs, constitute the "full cost" of a sale. Developing
complete and understandable FMS pricing guidance, for
example, has proven to be no small undertaking. DOD has
focused a considerable amount of attention on improving its
pricing policies and cost recovery criteria, with GAO acting,
in many instances, to prod their action. Improved policy
guidance has led to increased FMS cost recoupment.
Recoupment, however, still remains well below where it should
be if the FMS program is to operate at no loss to the
Government. [Ref. 21]
The Foreign Military Sales Program is being subsidized by
DOD in that the cost of quality assurance services performed
by the Defense Contract Administration Services Regions
(DCASR's) is not being recovered from foreign governments.
GAO estimated that up to $370 million had not been recovered
from fiscal 1973 through 1978. Most of this amount was not
recovered because Defense lacks a workable system through
which the DCASRs can find out which items are being procured
for FMS. Without adequate identification, quality assurance
inspectors are not able to provide the Regions the necessary
data for billings to foreign customers for the inspection
services. The Services do not have a standard system for
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writing prime contracts that easily identify FMS items.
Therefore, the only way that DCASRs are able to determine the
amount of foreign sales is through detailed review and
analysis of contracts. GAO feels that the DCASRs do not have
enough qualified personnel to properly perform these
evaluations. [Ref. 22]
DOD is not charging foreign customers the replacement
cost of items sold from inventories, although required to do
so by law. Replacement costs are now generally much higher
than the prices charged. A recent GAO report focused
attention on sales from secondary equipment (i.e., not major
and complete systems) and spare parts inventories [Ref. 23].
These items are generally categorized as stock fund or
nonstock fund material. Stock funds are self-sustaining
revolving funds financed by sales to appropriated activities.
Nonstock fund items are purchased with direct appropriations
and are furnished without reimbursement. The magnitude of
secondary item sales is appreci abl e--23 percent of total FMS
in fiscal year 1976.
Defense Directive 7420.1 governs stock fund operations,
including pricing policies. It requires that each stock-
funded item must have a standard price for inventory
accounting and sales reimbursements. The standard price
includes three factors: procurement cost, transportation
cost, and a surcharge to offset operating losses. However,
standard prices, when based on historical costs, are not
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sufficient to recover replacement costs during periods of
inflation. In dn effort to remedy this situation, in fiscal
year 1976 the Secretary of Defense implemented a plan
referred to as the stock fund stabilization pricing policy.
Under the plan, prices included a surcharge which is
recomputed annually. GAO charges that, although the new
pricing policy does prevent depletion of the stock fund, it
does not generate sufficient funds to fully recover
replacement cost as required by the AECA.
For nonstock fund sales to foreign governments, military
departments were allowed to develop their own pricing poli-
cies and procedures. The methods used varied and resulted in
inconsistent and inadequate pricing. As a result, not all
replacement costs were recovered. Army regulations required
nonstock fund inventory items to be priced at the higher of
standard or replacement costs (if replacement costs exceeded
standard costs by five percent). This was interpreted
differently by separate commands, however. One command
decided that al
1
nonstock fund items would be replace and
determined that a 19.86-percent factor should be added to the
standard price of items sold to foreign governments. Another
command decided to determine, on an item-by-item basis, which
items were to be replaced. Prices for these items were
increased by using inflation indexes. The revised prices
became the billing prices to the foreign governments. The
Air Force decided to manually determine prices for FMS
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nonstock fund items. Standard prices were corrected by an
adjusted final billing. This process did not always work
because of the multitude of transactions involved and the
frequent use of erroneous pricing data. The Navy had no
system to ensure that replacement costs were charged to
foreign governments for nonstock fund items. The latest
revision to Defense's pricing policy, DOD Instruction 2140.1,
provides that all non-excess secondary items sold from
Defense inventories to foreign governments must be replaced
and requires that inflation factors be added to the inventory
price. Each year a new inflation factor is calculated and
replaces the prior year's factor. GAO reports that, although
the use of rates or factors is the most practicable means of
establishing the replacement cost, DOD's method does not
provide for the recovery of the replacement cost in those
cases where secondary items are purchased prior to the year
in which they are sold. For example, assuming an average
annual inflation rate of 7 percent, an item last purchased in
1975, sold in 1978, and replaced in 1979, would cost 28
percent more to replace than its inventory price (4 years at
7 percent a year). However, under Defense's methodology only
a 7-percent inflation factor would be added to the inventory
price since prior year inflation factors would be eliminated.
Thus, the item would be sold at the 1975 price plus 7 percent,
which would not provide for the replacement of the item.
Inflation or replacement must be compounded where items were
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last purchased during earlier fiscal years. GAO maintains
that Defense's decentralized approach to pricing has not
worked. [Ref. 24]
C. FMS TRUST FUND DIFFERENCES
The General Accounting Office disclosed that DOD's FMS
detailed accounting records differed by $1.5 billion from
trust fund records showing cash on hand for September 30,
1979 [Ref. 25]. Defense could not fully explain this
difference. DOD departments and agencies make payments for
FMS cases and directly charge the cash account at the
Treasury. Monthly, they are required to send the SAAC a
breakdown of total expenditures by country. They must also
provide the SAAC with detailed expenditure reports for use in
posting detailed sales case accounting records. Thus,
foreign trust fund balances kept by DOD are recorded in two
records at the SAAC: (1) trust fund accounts in which all
collections and disbursements of each customer are tracked,
and (2) detailed sales case accounting records indicating
which sales agreement are affected. These records should
agree, and, unless they do, DOD cannot give foreign customers
a proper accounting for their funds nor control the monies
available for FMS purchases. The sales case accounting
records are used to prepare FMS billings; they should




Some of the differences between the accounting records
have been explained. Processing delays prevent the detailed
sales case records from being as up to date as the trust fund
records. Each department, for a variety of reasons,
encounters delays in reporting detailed transactions.
Another cause cited for differences is the existence of
system deficiencies, referring primarily to the handling of
inter-country transfers. Agreements whereby a sales to one
country is financed by another causes problems. The SAAC has
recorded the intercountry transfers in the trust funds, but
failed to make corresponding entries in sales case records.
Entries were not made because the cases could not be
identified. Data processing frequently causes errors also.
Expenditure data may be rejected when it does not meet the
SAAC's edit criteria. Voluminous rejections have led to a
sizable time lag. Further, differences have been perpetuated
over time. Trust account balances result from collections
and disbursements dating from the inception of the FMS
program. However, sales case records are maintained only for
active cases. When cases are closed, the cash balance, if
any, is either returned to the customer or transferred to
remaining active cases. The handling of cash balances would
not cause differences if records were properly closed and
entries to trust fund accounts were made accurately. Past
errors have occurred, however, and they may never come to




The Department of Defense has recognized that action must
be taken to improve the accuracy of the FMS accounting and
financial management system. Each military department, along
with the SAAC, however, has developed its own accounting
system for foreign military sales. They have not provided
accurate nor timely data, and DOD is unable to render foreign
customers a proper accounting of their funds. As an example
of cont i nui ng-type difficulties, the following is an excerpt
from a recent GAO report:
In September 1979, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) issued instructions requiring the military
departments to provide detailed foreign military sales
reconciliation data to the Center. Specifically, the
departments are required to provide the Center a monthly
report of reconciliation between the value of
expenditures charged to the trust fund and individual
disbursements charged to specific sales cases.
Each military department has reacted differently to the
requirement. The Army is currently unable to meet the
requirement without certain accounting system
modifications. Army officials advised us that it would
take up to 18 months before such capability could be
implemented. The Navy, although able to meet the
requirement, is seeking a waiver of the requirement to
list individual reconciliation items. Air Force
officials advised us that they are satisfied with the
recnci 1 i at i on requirements but will seek changes to other




Many echelons within DOD are involved in developing
expenditure projections in the FMS field. As a result,
projections have been poor, and Defense's ability to ensure
compliance with provisions of the AECA has been limited.
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The act requires that adequate foreign customer funds be on
deposit in the trust fund in advance of an expenditure being
made. Expenditure projections must also be precise because
of the impact on the budgeting systems of the various foreign
governments involved.
2. FMS Delivery and Performance Reporting
Shipments of articles, and services provided, to
foreign nations by Defense contractors are not promptly
reported to the SAAC. The status of orders reported to
foreign customers is, therefore, inaccurate and creates
customer dissatisfaction. As an example of many, the Army
completed delivery of 111 wreckers valued at $8.9 million to
Iran in 1977, but two years later it still had not reported
this information to the Center.
3. Progress Payments
Defense does not have accounting systems which are
able to accurately assign to sales agreements those progress
payments made to contractors for a foreign government. In
lieu of making an accurate accounting, the systems
arbitrarily allocate the payments to Defense appropriations'
and foreign customer's accounts. Therefore, they are unable
to assure that the correct country's trust fund has been
charged for the items and services produced and delivered.
[Ref. 28]
4. Personnel Problems
The military departments and the SAAC are severely
restricted in their ability to respond to new foreign
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military sales policies because the number of experienced
professional financial management personnel is limited.
Problems also exist at the Secretary of Defense level. For
example, only two accountants were found by GAO to be
assigned for the preparation and updating of FMS policies in
the areas of billing, collecting, pricing, and accounting
[Ref. 29]. Funding for additional personnel should not be a
problem for Defense, since the AECA requires foreign
governments to provide reimbursement for the cost of
administering the FMS program. The cost of additional
personnel needed to administer the program should be covered
by reimbursements. However, military and civilian personnel
ceilings do exist, having been imposed on DOD by Congress,





The degree of centralization of organizations is an
indication of what the organization assumes about its
members: high centralization implies an assumption that
the members need tight control, of whatever form; low
formalization suggests that the members can govern
themselves. [Ref. 30]
A. GAO SOLUTION
The General Accounting Office (GAO) believes that the
best and most expeditious way for Defense to resolve its
foreign military sales financial management and accounting
problems is to establish a centralized accounting and
disbursing organization. Foreign military sales are unique
in that funds of other countries are involved. The United
States has fiduciary responsibility that goes beyond normal
Government appropriation and expenditure accounting. By the
terms of the Arms Export Control Act, the cost of the program
must be assessed foreign governments, and therefore, good
accounting, costing, and financial management systems are
required. The General Accounting Office has frequently
criticized the Department of Defense for its inability to
properly manage the finances of the foreign sales program.
Serious problems still exist, and GAO believes that they will
continue unless a comprehensive centralized accounting and
financial management system is developed solely for foreign
military sales. GAO has stated that, although other
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alternatives exist, the best long-term solution is a central
organization responsible for obligation and expenditure
accounting and disbursing of funds, and assuring that all
costs properly chargeable to the program are recovered.
[Ref. 31]
B. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Centralization of FMS accounting and financial management
is expected to have several advantages. Major advantages
i ncl ude:
-- Uniform Accounting and Financial Reporting
Each of the military departments has a different
accounting system for FMS. Uniform accounting will eliminate
the reporting of nonstandard accounting data and provide
greater accounting control.
--Direct Cite Accounting
Reimbursable accounting requires adjustments and
transfers of funds between appropriations. There is always
the possibility that U.S. appropriations will not be fully
reimbursed, creating an illegal subsidy of foreign sales.
Direct citation accounting eliminates this possibility.
-- Control Over Disbursements
Direct control over FMS disbursements will reduce
reconciliation requirements between trust fund accounts and




Better accounting will better enable Defense to meet its
fiduciary responsibility to foreign customers.
-- Expenditure Projections
More precise expenditure projections will be possible
because of the elimination of some of the echelons currently
involved in their development.
-- P1 anni ng
Better programwide (DOD FMS) planning is envisioned since
accounting and financial management will no longer be fragmented
As with most new systems, centralization of FMS
accounting and financial management is also expected to
elicit some problems. These disadvantages include:
-- Conversion
New precedures will necessitate changes. Initially, dual
systems will be required.
-- Personnel
Numerous qualified personnel will be required. Funding
will not be a problem, since the AECA requires foreign
governments to reimburse the cost of FMS administration;
however, military and civilian personnel ceilings do exist.
C. SUBSEQUENT ACTION
As a result of GAO ' s criticism and recommendation, the
Department of Defense decided to conduct a test of the Appli-
cation of centralization to the FMS program. The remainder of
this thesis addresses the development and evaluation of the test
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VI. CENTRALIZATION TEST--DE VELOPMENT
Centralization could take several years. It should be
carefully planned, and any new system should be
thoroughly tested and proven before implementation. In
this regard, the steering group charged with identifying
and ranking according to priority foreign military sales
financial management problems should be strengthened so
that it is able to monitor the implementation of any new
or improved systems. [Ref. 32]
A. INCEPTION
1 . GAP Recommendations
In March 1979, the General Accounting Office released
a report assailing DOD's FMS pricing pol i ci es--sayi ng that by
failing to properly implement these policies, DOD was
effectively allowing U.S. appropriations to subsidize foreign
military sales. GAO recommended that Defense assign specific
responsibility for implementing FMS pricing policies to a new
or existing organization that could be freed from other work
to properly monitor the implementation. [Ref. 33]
In May of the same year, after a general review of
FMS problems, GAO recommended that DOD produce a plan for
centralizing accounting and financial management. It
specified that the plan should include obligation and
expenditure accounting and disbursing of funds, and should
assure that all costs properly chargeable to the program were
fully recovered. Specifically, the plan was to (1) specify
the responsibilities of the central accounting organization,
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(2) identify the support required from organizations involved
in the FMS program, including personnel needs and
descriptions of duties, (3) establish detailed policies and
procedures, (4) define systems requirements, (5) establish
milestones for development, testing, and implementation,
including the transfer of existing personnel positions to the
centralized accounting organization, and (6) require that the
new system be developed and designed in accordance with the
Comptroller General's accounting principles and standards and
submitted to him for formal approval. [Ref. 34]
The General Accounting Office felt that together,
these recommendations would, in the long term, be the best
alternative for solving the accounting and financial
management problems plaguing the foreign military sales
program.
2 . Congressional Direction
The House of Representatives Committee on
Appropriations, on September 1979, agreed with GAO '
s
recommendation on the need for centralization of FMS
accounting. [Ref. 35] The Committee reviewed the existing
problems, and highlighted their agreement by illustrating
what happened when Iran cancelled its FMS orders:
DOD could not go to one source and determine with any
degree of accuracy what the cash balance for this account
was. It became necessary for each military department to
designate special management teams to visit various
commands and accounting activities in an attempt to
understand the financial situation. As late as March
1979, it was estimated the $1 billion in deliveries had
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been made to Iran but not reported to the SAAC In
addition, about $250 million in U.S. Army and U.S. Air
Force direct-cite progress payments have been made on
behalf of Iran but not identified at the FMS case level
to the SAAC. [Ref. 36]
The Department of Defense was directed to produce a
plan for centralized accounting and financial management.
The plan was required to include obligations and expenditure
accounting and disbursing of funds. FMS accounting was to be
separated from accounting for Defense's own operations to the
maximum extent practicable. Because of the seriousness of
the problems in terms of the amounts involved, and the need
to properly account for the foreign funds, the Committee set
a March 1980 deadline for the submission of the plan.
3. Defense Response
In November 1979, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) (ASD(C)) declared that Defense would conduct a
six- to twelve-month test, beginning February 1980, wherein
the obligation accounting and disbursing for several large
FMS contracts from each Service would be centralized at the
SAAC. Only sales transactions involving direct-cite
procurements were considered in the plan.
DSAA, in conjunction with the SAAC, was assigned
responsibility for the test and was to be the principal point
of contact to provide overall test coordination. All
Services were directed to participate fully and provide
support as required. DSAA was to submit quarterly progress
reports on the test results, initially to address the
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compilation of a milestone plan, and later to discuss the
merits and problems of centralization. The ASD(C) required
DSAA to render a final report upon completion of the test,
but no later than February 1931. [Ref. 37]




Project officers from each of the Services and DSAA
first met on November 1979 at the SAAC, with the purpose of
reviewing the test objectives and discussing implementation.
A summarized version of the objectives adopted from this
meeting follows:
--Evaluate the feasibility of centralization of
accounting and disbursing of direct-cite procurements.
--Verify advantages/disadvantages of centralization.
--Develop DOD accounting and disbursing systems to meet
FMS directives.
--Define resource and system development requirements.
--Determine the degree of centralization that will
yield the greatest benefit for the resources invested.
--Provide the basis for DOD's report to the Congress.
[Ref. 38]
2. Milestones
A second Project Officer's Meeting was held the
following month to establish milestones and coordinate the
scope and content of the test. As a result of this meeting,
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DSAA prepared and submitted a milestone plan to ASD(C).
Dated December 31, 1979, a summary of its highlights follows
[Ref. 39]
ACTION
--Services identify candidate contracts.
They should provide a sufficient volume and
variety of transactions to expose system
complexities, without exceeding capabilities of
the test team.
--SAAC selection of contracts to be used
for the test.
--Initiate quarterly status reports to
DSAA.
--Services identify and define the
information required as feedback on
transactions for management status reports.
--Publish detailed test procedures.
--Services provide advance copies of
selected contracts to SAAC.
--Services audit and amend selected
contracts and accomplish all actions necessary
for proper transfer of accountability.
--Final coordination on test procedures.
--Fully audited contract files and















--ASD(C) report to the Congress. 31 Mar 30
--Develop and implement, with concurrence
of the Services, a mechanized system of interface
with the automated systems of the Services. 1 Jul 30
--Each of the Services and the test team
prepare and submit a final report to DSAA. 14 Nov 80
--DSAA to submit a final draft report to
ASD(C) noting advantages and disadvantages of
centralization. 15 Jan 81
--ASD(C) report to the Congress, noting
test conclusions and recommendations. 31 Jan 81
3. Contract Transfer Process
Procedures were developed to ensure an orderly
transfer of responsibility and accountability from each
Service to the SAAC. The following actions were taken (in
succession) concerning those contracts chosen for the
centralization test: [Ref. 40]
--Services provided advance copies of contracts and
modifications to the SAAC.
--A disbursement cutoff date was established and
contracts were scheduled for audit through the effective
transfer date.
--Services requested contractual commitment authority
(CCA) from the SAAC in the amount equal to the total value of
the obligation authority (0A) and any outstanding commitments
reflected in the accounting records for each contract.
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--Services modified contracts and unobligated
commitment documents to show the new accounting
classification and changed the paying station to AFAFC/SAAC.
--Services returned OA to the SAAC by use of the
existing DD 2060 process.
--Services transferred accountability for cumulative
disbursements to the SAAC. Paid disbursements for each
contract were transferred to the FMS Trust Fund Account.
--Services returned expenditure authority (EA)
previously received from the SAAC equal to the disbursements
being transferred.
--The SAAC Test Team initiated contractual
di sbursements .
--Services provided the SAAC with a complete financial
audit of all obligations, commitments, disbursements,
unrecouped progress payments, and deliveries through the
transfer date.
4. Operating Procedures
a. Transfer of Authority
For the purposes of the centralization test, all
Services were required to return the OA previously received
from the SAAC. This applied only to the direct-cite
cases/contracts chosen for the test. As a replacement for
OA, the Services received CCA. Contractual Commitment
Authority (CCA) represented the Procuring Contracting
Officer's (PCO's) authority to incur commitments and
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obligations, not disbursements however. Expenditure
authority was also returned to the SAAC. It was reissued
internally as FMS invoices were received for payment.
b
.
Accountab i 1 i ty
To facilitate the test, the SAAC utilized the Air
Force base-level B3500/3700 computer maintained by the
Accounting and Finance Office (ACF) located at AFAFC. This
effectively suballocated authority/ responsibility to AFAFC.
Although contrary to the requirements of the ASO(C) and DSAA
that the SAAC act as the accountable station and disbursing
office during the test period, this action did retain the
accountability within AFAFC and negated the requirement for
additional resources to establish separate accounts control
and disbursing functions within the SAAC.
c. Files and Ledgers
The Contract Accounting Division of the SAAC set
up three main files on each contract transferred in the test.
These included: (1) Contract File--the basic contract along
with all supporting documents, (2) Modification File— all
contract modifications, and (3) Payment File— al 1 pertinent
documents relating to payments. Contract ledgers were
established for each contract and subdivided by FMS customer.
These were further subdivided by FMS case, and each case by
Accounting Classification Reference Number (ACRN). Each ACRN
was separated by Contract Line Item Number (CLIN).
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Obligations, disbursements, and progress payments were posted
at the ACRN level. Quantity data was also maintained at the
ACRN level (or CLIN level if there were more than one CLIN
per ACRN). [Ref. 41]
d. Performance Reporting
Documents used to support the contractor's work
claims are the DD Form 1195 (for work in progress) and the DD
Form 250 (for completed work). After invoices were paid by
AFAFC/ACF, these forms were returned to the Test Team, where
their information was converted to the standard DD Form 1517
(DIFS) input format. After editing, this was processed to a
FMS Performance Report and FMS Billing Letter (DD Form 645).
Because of the separate and unique accounting/delivery
reporting methodology used by the Services, it was necessary
to separate payment documents by military service, and then
by country and case. The DD Form 1517 was prepared
differently for each Service to report progress payments and
del i veri es
.
e. Management Feedback Reporting
Given that each Service had its own unique
reporting requirements, a standardized approach to reporting
was not envisioned. Each Service requirement was dealt with
on an individual basis.
(1) Army . Due to the Army's extensive use
of Appropriation Reimbursable Funding for FMS procurements, a
ready vehicle for the reporting of direct-cite disbursements
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did not exist in a standard format. Workable report formats
were developed. Hard-copy distribution was set up utilizing
postal channel s
.
(2) Air Force . The Air Force elected to receive
feedback data in the form of a Contract Payment Notice (CPN)
that conforms to MILSCAP specifications (DOD Instruction
4105. 63-M). The autodin network was utilized for data
transmission. Additional reports were made using a postal
distribution.
(3) Navy . The Navy elected to receive hard-copy
feedback, in lieu of a card-tape update to their system.
Their report was distributed to project officers through
postal channels. [Ref. 42]
f. Contract Involvement
Initially, the test involved sixteen contracts
(eight Army, five Navy, and three Air Force). They
represented a total sales value in excess of $220 million and
thirteen different contractors were involved.
C. TEST REVISIONS
1 . Expansi on
A review of available correspondence showed that most
participants felt that the number of contracts and cases
included in the test was too small to provide valid
conclusions concerning the feasibility of centralized
accounting and disbursing. The initial scope of the test was
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deliberately kept small to validate test procedures and
ensure that sufficient contract accounting expertise was
available at the SAAC to conduct the test. As of May 7,
1980, the SAAC had processed 107 disbursements consisting of
43 payments and 64 commercial invoices, which amounted to
$35.5 million for 7 contracts. A preliminary audit report by
the Defense Audit Service (DAS) indicated the scope of the
test should be increased to approximately 100-150 contracts.
Each Service subsequently nominated additional contracts, and
"phase II" of the contract transfer process began with the
SAAC receiving advance copies of contracts in August 1980.
Initially, some FMS cases were excluded from the
test contracts. For example, for Army and Navy contracts,
the SAAC was only given one case for each contract. Thi-s
required the participating contractors to submit three
requests for each progress payment: one for direct
procurement materiel, one for FMS materiel not included in
the test, and one for FMS materiel included in the test. The
inclusion of all cases from each contract selected for the
test was subsequently approved to remedy this situation.
2. Extensi on
Originally, the test provided for completing the
test, including a final report, within twelve months. The
test was to be fully operational by March 1, 1980. However,
as of May 1, 1980, all needed information for four (of the
sixteen) contracts had not yet been received by the SAAC.
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Because of this delayed beginning and the expanded number
of contracts involved, the test was extended. Various key
milestone dates were rescheduled: the test itself was
extended to September 30, 1981. Final reports became due to
DSAA from the Services on October 30, 1981. DSAA's final
report due date to the ASD(C) was revised to December 21,
1981.
3. Automat i on
One of the most difficult tasks associated with the
test was the provision of management feedback data on a
recurring basis to military department financial and
procurement activities. Initially, the test team provided
feedback to the Services using six unique reporting
formats--all were manually produced. Individual report
requirements differed in several ways: (1) reporting
periods, (2) number of reports required, (3) level of detail,
and (4) method of presentation. The Navy wanted its data
presented by Accounting Classification Reference Number
(ACRN), the Army by Purchase Request Order Number (PRON), and
the Air Force by Materiel Program Code (MPC). To support the
complexity of these reporting formats, and considering the
expanded scope of the centralized test, it became necessary
to automate.
The development of a mechanized systems package began
in mid-August 1980. The AFAFC base level Burroughs B3700
system was initially utilized to facilitate contractor
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payments, maintain contract disbursement histories, and
update the status of allotment accounting records. While
actual payment procedures were mechanized, the detailed
contract accounting ledgers were manually posted. The
systems package envisioned the use of the AFAFC IBM 370 and
was designed to enhance the mechanized payment procedure by
producing B3700 interfacing data, maintaining the status of
allotment records, preparing detailed contract ledgers at the
contract/ACRN level and producing management feedback reports
for each of the Services and DLA.
Initial automation milestones were optimistic and had
to be revised several times, but system development
continued. A detailed contract accounting master file was
developed for each contract, country/case, and ACRN. From
this file, all external management feedback, as well as
various internal reports and ledgers, could be extracted.
Cumulative contract accounting financial data was loaded into
the new system (now called CM I S--Cont ract Management
Information System) during the January through March 1981
timeframe. A detailed reconciliation then took place between
the manual payment ledgers and the mechanized status of funds
ledgers from the B3700 system. Upon completion, and to
ensure accuracy and completeness of financial reporting and
transaction input, processing was conducted in parallel (IBM
370 and B3700) during the month of June. CMIS was considered
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to be successful and the SAAC Test Team became accountable
for the system on July, 1, 1981. [Ref. 43]
4. Performance Reporting
The Services' record of various and untimely methods
of reporting materi el /servi ce performance has been disclosed
by GAO and DAS. Therefore, the test team was directed to
develop and test alternative methods of providing
standardized, timely, and accurate delivery/performance
report i ng.
Currently, the Navy assigns a MILSTRIP document
number to each end-item, and upon shipment inputs an actual
price DD 1517 transaction. Separate DD 1517 transactions are
input for each element of add-on cost, such as travel, RDT&E,
labor and overhead, etc. Current delivery reporting methods
for the Army and Air Force require the test team to input DD
1517 transactions into DIFS for the net disbursements of both
contract or progress payments and actual deliveries to the
FMS customer. When all costs related to the procurement of
an item are known, the Service concerned then inputs a DD
1517 transaction which automatically liquidates progress
payments and reports delivery of the item to the customer.
[Ref. 44]
Two primary alternative methods of delivery/
performance reporting were proposed for testing. Referred to
as "enhanced procedures", they were applicable only to the
Army and Air Force. The Army began testing deliveries for
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the Dragon missile contract on 1 November 1980. For this
portion of the test, progress payments were inputed in the
normal fashion and deliveries (at an estimated price) were
reported upon receipt of a DD 250. The Army was to reverse
the SAAC's estimated input with an actual price once the
total item cost had been finalized. The Air Force was
scheduled to commence enhanced delivery testing in early
March 1981 for the F-5 contract. For this portion of the
test, the Air Force was to report a delivery (at estimated
price) upon receipt of a DD 250. When the final price was
known, the case manager would reverse the estimated amount
and enter an actual delivered value. Delivery reporting
procedures for the Navy were not altered. Although somewhat
cumbersome because of the manual method in which the
tansactions are processed, the Navy's reporting procedures
appear to work exceptionally well for tracking all aspects of
performance in a timely manner. [Ref. 45]
During the course of the test, it became apparent
that, to perform enhanced reporting, numerous system changes
would have to be made by the Services and/or the SAAC ;
therefore evaluation of alternatives was limited. The Army's
test had come to a standstill July 1981. The SAAC must have,
and be able to provide, an FMS document number (or pseudo
document number) input for the DD 1517 to allow
identification of the item to the Service for updating the
final delivery price. Army's method of assigning document
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numbers and the procedure for tracking status of items makes
it impossible to identify the FMS number on a OD 250 since
the majority of FMS contracted items are procured with Army
document numbers. FMS document numbers are assigned early in
the procurement cycle, but are not provided to contractors
unless the items are for direct shipment to the customer.
(Army's normal procedure is to have items shipped to a depot
for final assembly or subsequent reshipment to the customer.)
It is envisioned that this problem could not be solved
without extensive procedural revisions and reprogrammi ng.
The Air Force F-5 program managers have opted to wait for
publication of a revised Air Force regulation; hence this
portion of the enhanced reporting test had not yet begun July
1981.
5. Manpower Study
In August 1980, the SAAC asked the AFAFC Management
Engineering Branch to develop work standards to determine the
manpower requirement for the centralized unit if the
centralization concept was adopted by DOD and Congress. A
Manpower Study Group (MSG) was subsequently established by
DSAA, consisting of Management Engineering Branch personnel
and representatives of each of the Services. The MSG was,
specifically, to be responsible for projecting manpower
requirements for a centralized operation based on data
gathered from the test site and any manpower standards/guides
furnished by DOD components for similar functions that they
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performed. Their results were to be used by another group
tasked to conduct an economic analysis.
Several assumptions were made by the MSG in the
development of their manpower model: (1) a valid
relationship exists between man-hours expended and payments
made, (2) the centralized operation will continue to develop
and implement ADP procedures, (3) manpower savings resulting
from mechanizing manual operations can be estimated with an
acceptable degree of accuracy, and (4) during implementation
of centralization, contract workload will be transferred to
the SAAC incrementally, allowing periodic evaluation
of manpower requirements and phased allocation of manpower
resources. The man-hour and workload relationship
experienced by the SAAC during the four-month period ending
February 1981 was used as the basis of an estimating model.
Data collected for months prior to November 1980 were
considered unusable due to extremely low work center
activity. The model was developed using payments as the
independent variable. Use of an average workload in an
estimating equation indicated a need for approximately 271
manpower spaces. Assuming that centralization of newly
acquired contract workload would cover approximately two
years, and that seventy-five percent of the workload would be
transferred in the first year, a manpower savings due to
automation was applied at a twenty percent rate each
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yeai—yielding an estimated need, after automation, for a
total of 217 spaces at the SAAC. [Ref. 46]
Several arguments have been presented to discredit
the MSG's estimating model: (1) it is based on a population
(manual mode) that cannot be extrapolated to another
population (greatly increased workload and mechanized
operation), (2) measurement of the test organization is not
representative because all functions are not being performed
in the test that would be required if total centralization
were directed, and (3) the test workload does not permit
accurate projections of manpower requirements for ar\ expected
workload of 10,000 contracts. Realizing that these arguments
might have some credence, and that better alternative methods
of analysis might exist, the MSG and the participating
Services opted to still utilize the existing model. Impetus
for this decision appeared to be a requirement to provide
needed input to the economic analysis by March 1981.
On 30 June 1981, based on an evaluation of seven
months of data, the Manpower Study Group revised their
estimated full-scale manning figure from 217 to 166. This
figure is fairly close to an independently developed
requirement of 128 positions estimated by the test team
itself, based on the assumption of a highly automated
contract payment system with interface with OIFS and the




In September 1930, the Defense Audit Service (DAS)
recommended that an "economic analysis" be conducted
regarding the centralized test. [Ref. 47] The SAAC , not
having the required expertise, requested the Air Force Cost
and Management Analysis Directorate to take the lead in
conducting the analysis.
Within DOD, "economic analysis" has a certain
meaning. That is, it means: (1) establishing objectives to
be achieved, (2) identifying all alternative methods
of achieving these objectives, (3) identifying and comparing
costs and benefits of these alternatives, (4) identifying
risks and sensitivities of the various alternatives, and (5)
making a recommendation upon which management can base a
decision. In order to constrain the possible alternatives,
DAS was requested to clarify their meaning of the expression
"economic analysis". Their clarification indicated that what
was wanted was a comparison of the costs and benefits of the
current method of operations versus the proposed centralized
concept. Thus, an Economic Analysis Working Group was
formed, with representatives of all Services and DLA, to
compare the current method and only one proposal. The
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (ASD(C))





As of 30 June 1981, the three Services had nominated an
additional 150 contracts for the centralized test. Phase II
contract transfer status is portrayed in Table I. The Army,
which had originally specified thirty- nine contracts for
transfer, decreased that number to twenty. When concern was
voiced that the Army might not have a representative sample
to achieve a valid test evaluation, they nominated an
additional three contracts.
The completion date for the Phase II contract transfer
was 1 November 1980. Transfer is still not complete. This
is causing considerable difficulty in processing timely
payments, and result in the reporting of incomplete manage-
gement feedback to the Services. Non-return of obligational
authority (0A) to the trust fund has impacted heavily on
program and case managers, primarily by causing a considerable
delay in responding to CCA requests for certain cases. Another
problem is caused by the incomplete transfer of disbursement
histories from previous DCASR paying stations and the incom-
plete transfer of accountability from the previous Air Force
accountable stations. Until both transfers are complete, the
test team will not have an accurate record of disbursements,
and Services will not receive correct case/contract financial
status. Table I also points out that relatively few audit
reports have been received from the Air Force. Without an
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VII. CENTRALIZATION TEST--E VALUATION
Of all the managerial functions which executives perform,
whether at top, middle, lower, or even worker levels,
the act of making a decision is without equal in
importance— that is to say, the act of making the ri ght
decision about the right problem or opportunity. [Ref . 49]
A. BASIC ORGANIZATION
1. Background and Basis of Test
The background leading to the centralization test at
the SAAC has been described in earlier chapters. Poor
financial management of the FMS program stemmed from an
exponential growth in foreign sales and the inability of each
of the military services to separately cope with rising
problems. Time and again, the GAO reported to Congress on
Defense's inability to master the situation. Hoping to have
finally hit upon the solution, GAO purported centralization
as the ultimate answer. Hence, Defense was directed to
develop a plan of centralization. Importantly, it had to
ensure full-cost recovery, and a system separate and distinct
from all others was to be developed if possible.
2. Test Objectives
With this direction, DOD devised a plan of action
centering around a limited test of centralized management.
The objectives of the test, outlined in the previous chapter,
included: feasibility, advantages and disadvantages, system
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development, and resource determination. Defense also wanted
the test to determine the degree of centralization that would
yield the highest benefit for the resources supplied. This
last objective is of the format frequently found in a
cost/benefit analysis.
B. EVOLUTION
As the test developed, and various problems surfaced, the
plan and its implementation milestones were altered.
Delivery/performance reporting, for example, has become a key
issue. Enhanced reporting procedures were developed for two
of the three Services, but implementation has been halting
and slow. Another issue of growing importance is the
"economic analysis", which has been reduced to a cost
comparison between centralization and the current method
of doing business.
C. RESULTS
1 . Pi sbursement s
A comparison of detailed accounting records and trust
fund records has revealed major differences. The extent,
possible causes, and results of these differences were
discussed in Chapter IV. Under pre-test conditions,
disbursements were made by numerous Service disbursing
activities (or DCASRs). Delayed transaction reporting was a
major cause of the disparity between detailed sales case
accounting records and trust fund accounts. Direct-cite
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procurement cases, under the centralized test, are paid by
the SAAC. Disbursements ^re recorded in both areas
simultaneously now, vastly reducing the amount of
reconciliation necessary for adequate visibility and control.
Through June 1981, in excess of $1.25 billion had been
disbursed by the centralized activity against the test
contracts .
2. Feedback Reporting
Management information reports have long been
provided by local accounting activities. Under the
centralized test, the SAAC is responsible for these reports.
The Services actually participated in the design and
refinement of the reports by providing their information
requirements. Initially produced manually, the reporting has
since been mechanized. Responses from both project officers
and other recipients concerning the adequacy, timeliness, and
format of the management reports have indicated satisfaction
to date. [Ref. 50]
The test team is currently looking beyond existing
processing methods and report formats to develop a more
standardized and efficient system. Such a system is
envisioned to provide magnetic tape interfaces with each of
the Service's automated management systems. However, the
implementation of a mechanized system of interface has been
deferred. The use of MILSCAP reporting has been determined
to offer the most expeditious method of transmitting
69

standardized contract payment and delivery data.
Transmission of CPN information via MILS CAP has been tested
successfully with the Air Force's Acquisition Management
Information System (AMIS). However, the Army and Navy still
prefer CPN updates via magnetic tape. Standardization of
input formats will require a massive restructuring of the
CMIS master file to include MILSCAP data elements. Following
the restructure, CPN data will be produced and validated
mechanically with only minimal manual intervention.
3. Contract Fundi ng
Obligational authority (OA) is retained at the SAAC
under the centralized test. Contractual Commitment Authority
(CCA) is issued to the Services' procurement activities in
its place. Under the previous system, OA was issued to
Service accounting activities, and finance offices were
required to certify all procurement documents. Expenditure
authority (EA) is also retained at the SAAC under the test,
rather than being issued to Service accounting activities.
These procedures have significantly reduced or eliminated the
long funding chains previously existing and have shortened
the resulting time lags in authority and reporting.
4. Probl ems
The slowness of progress being made in the transfer
of all Phase II contracts to the SAAC has led to several
problems. These were highlighted in the previous chapter.
The project officers have indicated that immediate action
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will be taken to expedite the transfers. Upon receipt of all
contracts, audits, and disbursement histories, and the return
of OA to the trust fund, the SAAC will be in a position to
process payments in a more timely fashion, respond faster to
CCA requests, and render the correct financial status of each
case/contract to the military departments.
The manpower study, being conducted to determine
personnel requirements, now shows a need for 166 full-time
employees at the SAAC. The test team feels that only 128
positions will be required to centralize the processing of
all direct-cite procurement contracts. Different assumptions
have been made leading to these two estimates. The primary
causes of this divergence are: (1) the use of different
numbers of contracts to be inputed within a two-year period,
and (2) the test team's assumption of the use of an automated
contract payment system with interface with DIFS and the
Services' management information systems. Each of the
Services is concurrently estimating manpower (and costs) for
operations external to the SAAC in the event that
centralization is pursued.
A considerable amount of work has been accomplished
towards enhancing performance reporting to the military
Services. The development and status of these efforts is
contained in the previous chapter. In summary, enhanced
delivery/performance reporting was originally contemplated
for all Services. Later, only the Army and Air Force were
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scheduled to be tested--the test team felt that existing
procedures employed with the Navy worked exceptionally well,
and major changes were not thought necessary. Currently,
both Army and Air Force tests have come to a standstill.
5. Objective Achievement
a. Feasibi 1 i ty
The determination of feasibility and
applicability of a centralized concept to the FMS program was
a prime objective of the centralized test. It was
constructed to examine the process as applied to a
significant number of different kinds of contracts from each
of the Services. Centralized receipt reporting, disbursement
procedures, accounting, and performance reporting have been
included in the test. Results, to date, have conclusively
shown that it is possible to consolidate the accounting and
financial management of direct-cite procurement contracts, at
least to some degree involving a limited number of
contracts/cases .
b. Resource Determination
Another objective of the test has been to
estimate the resources required to conduct business in a
centralized mode. The SAAC, in conjunction with the
Services, DLA, and DSAA, are currently conducting studies to
produce this information. The Manpower Study Group (MSG) has
examined several months of data, made assumptions regarding
future case loads (if centralization is adopted) and
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implementation rates, and extrapolated, producing an
estimated personnel requirement for the centralized unit.
Military Services are also conducting studies to determine
the manning effect of centralization within each department.
The personnel estimates, when finalized, are to
be a major input of the "economic analysis "--in reality a
comparison between centralization and the current way of
conducting business. Other "costs" are being examined to
this effort, not only dollars and personnel, but other
resources: including time, computer usage and programming,
equipment, and others.
c. Advantages/Disadvantages
Many, although not all, of the advantages and
disadvantages purported by centralization have been examined
by the test. A reduction of reconciliation requirements
between trust fund accounts and detailed sales case
accounting records is evidenced by simultaneous posting
procedures at the centralized activity. The status of
foreign funds (at least those concerning the contracts/cases
within the test) is enhanced by the new procedures. This is
mainly due to a decreased authorization and reporting chain
and the existence of the centralized disbursing function. On
the negative side, the problems inherent in converting to a
new system have been apparent. Besides the need to iron out
system development wrinkles, chief among these problems was
73

the need to maintain dual systems while debugging the new
CMIS at the SAAC.
There were some advantages, claimed by backers
for centralization of FMS, that are not supported by the test
results. The advantage of direct-cite versus reimbursable
accounting is one such claim. Until both systems are tested,
it would be difficult to make a comparison. Another, which
is unsupportab 1 e , concerns expenditure projections. Although
it can be seen that centralization does involve a degree
of "shortcutt i ng" , a claim of more precise projections (as a
result of eliminating echelons involved in their development)
is indefensible by such a narrow test--i.e., the examination
of solely direct-cite procurement transactions,
d. System Development
Foreign Military Sales directives generally
reflect the AECA, calling for pricing and management to
ensure that the U.S. Government recovers full costs and
operates the FMS program on a no-profit/no loss basis.
Accounting and disbursing systems developed during the
centralized test do not guarantee compliance with these
requirements. Direct-cite procurement case accounting is
still largely dependent upon inputs, pricing, and reporting
from the military departments. Reimbursable accounting is
also unaffected by the test, and the opportunity for U.S.
Government subsidation of foreign sales remains.
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e. Degree of Centralization
Determining the degree of centralization that
will yield the greatest benefit for the resources invested
is a primary objective of the test. Two general areas of
study are attempting to answer this question: (1) the
"economic analysis "/cost comparison, and (2) investigation of
other alternatives. Neither of these alone will provide the
needed information. Each is being analyzed separately, and
there is no evidence indicating that a combined analysis,
utilizing the same underlying assumptions and decision
factors, is progressing. [Ref. 51]
D. RATIONALE FOR CENTRALIZATION
Limitation of the centralized test solely to direct-cite
procurement contracts/cases has similarly limited the test's
support for centralization. The elimination of the reporting
of nonstandard accounting data is not accomplished, nor has
pricing for full-cost recovery been affected by the test.
That is not to say the test is not contributing to the
centralization of FMS concept. Consolidated accounting and
disbursing has led to less fragmentation and more cooperation
between the Services. Further, simultaneous posting of
transactions to the trust fund and detailed sales case
accounts greatly diminishes the need for reconciliation. An
added benefit shown by test results, even barring the
problems encountered in the transfer of test cases, is the
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reduction in lag time of reporting and recording
expenditures, thus increasing the validity of status and
accounting reports rendered foreign governments.
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VIII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The tremendous growth in foreign sales, and many of the
problems the Department of Defense has had in managing its
FMS program, have been noted. The GAO has repeatedly pointed
out deficiencies in the program. Efforts to correct the
situation have, to this point, been piecemeal.
The General Accounting Office (GAO), in May 1979,
highlighted problems and recommended centralization as the
best long-range solution. Defense subsequently directed a
test of the centralized concept, involving several major
direct-cite FMS contracts. Under the direction of DSAA, the
test has been conducted at the SAAC. All Services and the
DLA have rendered assistance. Operating procedures were
developed to accept and combine test data from each Service.
Selected contracts, accountability, and paying responsibility
were transferred to the SAAC, which then became responsible
for accounting and feedback reporting to the departments
concerned.
The test has not produced sufficient evidence to support
the many advantages of centralization purported by the GAO.
This may, to some extent, be attributed to the limited scope
of the test--ie., only direct-cite contracts, not
reimbursab 1 es , were considered. Improved expenditure
projections and better programwide planning have not
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resulted; but again, the test's narrow scope precludes such
impacts affecting the entire program. Since pricing does not
fall under the control of the SAAC, centralization cannot, as
yet, assure that all costs properly chargeable to the FMS
program are fully recovered. Multiple input formats are
still utilized by the Services, although, once received by
the SAAC, information is uniformally restructured. One of
the biggest advantages realized through testing, has been the
effect of a centralized, dual posting of transactions to both
accounting and cash records. This vastly reduces efforts
required to reconcile trust fund accounts and detailed sales
case accounting records. Another benefit realized through
the centralization of direct-cite procurement contracts is a
reduction of the time required to post and update
transactions affecting (and hence increase the accuracy of)
foreign sales accounts. Faster accounting and financial
reporting can be directly attributed, at least in part, to
the shortening of funding authority and disbursement chains.
Retention of authority (both OA and EA) and disbursements by
the SAAC have resulted in contractors receiving their
payments quicker and foreign governments being billed
faster.
Although not yet completed, the test has already lent a
degree of relevancy to the concept of centralization of FMS
management and accounting. The feasibility has certainly
been established. What remains, is to determine whether
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centralization is better than separate systems. An
examination of other alternatives, and comparison against
centralization, also remains to be seen. Further study in
these areas should be the subject of a follow-up thesis.
In a Project Officers' Meeting in April 1981, the test
team encouraged members to recommend to DSAA that the
decision on centralization be made earlier, as soon as June
1981. Their position was, that for fourteen months,
procedures were tested, studied, retested, and restudied to
evaluate the significant issues associated with centralized
FMS accounting and disbursing for direct-cite contracts.
They felt that further testing would add little to the
decisionmaking process. Service representatives, however,
felt no need to push for an early decision, and no change was
recommended to the current milestone plan. [Ref. 52]
Pending final test results and a decision on
centralization, a hard look at the situation is advisable.
Without centralized management and accounting, or some other
new development, the FMS program is in trouble. The problems
and difficulties facing Defense have been addressed. The
program is not operating on a no-profit/no-loss basis, and
DOD has been frequently charged with subsidizing foreign
sales with U.S. funds. Centralization appears to be a step
forward in controlling the FMS program. A comparison test is
being conducted between current procedures and centralized
procedures. Costs, in personnel, resources, and dollars, may
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determine the "better" system. Accuracy, accountability, and
control are also important. Compliance with the AECA, and a
proper accounting of foreign funds in United States' custody,
should be paramount in the decision. By law, the costs
of conducting our FMS program, regardless of the chosen
method, are payable by foreign customers. Therefore, system
cost should not be an overriding factor.
It is recommended that the test of centralization of
direct-cite procurement contracts be run to its scheduled
completion. Its results should be compared, not only with
current procedural costs and benefits, but also with any
known feasible alternatives to centralization. Comparison
should be made on a like basis if at all possible, ie.,
similar assumptions and like data input. Barring the
existence of a more favorable alternative, or the unexpected
occurrence of a large insurmountable problem with the test,
centralization of direct-cite contracts should be implemented
at the SAAC on an expanded basis. A program of phased
growth, gradually increasing acceptance of the number of
contracts/cases involved, should be pursued. It is further
recommended that analysis of alternatives should be continued
during the implementation of centralization of direct-cite
procurement contracts. When the program has been completely
established, and is determined to be working smoothly,
testing of further centralization should begin. Unless a
better alternative is found, implementation and expansion of
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centralization should be pursued as the most viable means
of improving the existing situation. Only through the
complete and total centralization of accounting and
disbursing for the FMS program can all of GAO's purported
advantages of centralization be realized.
Although centralization is not a panacea for all the ills
of the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program, it is an
advancement. It is not reasonable to expect centralization
to bring about instant cures. It should be implemented
slowly and gradually; it should be tested, and its results
analyzed--it is a long-term solution. Something must be
done, however; too many problems have been brought to light.
Our FMS program is expanding. The situation is a potentially
embarrassing one to the United States. To ignore the
problems, not to seek advancement, might well leave the
United States open to charges of belittling the importance of
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